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We propose an efficient quantum key distribution scheme based on entanglement. The sender
chooses pairs of photons in one of the two equivalent nonmaximally entangled states randomly, and
sends a sequence of photons from each pair to the receiver. They choose from the various bases
independently but with substantially different probabilities, thus reducing the fraction of discarded
data, and a significant gain in efficiency is achieved. We then show that such a refined data analysis
guarantees the security of our scheme against a biased eavesdropping strategy.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is the art of providing secure communication over insecure communication channels. To achieve this
goal, an algorithm is used to combine a message with some additional information—known as the “key”—to produce
a cryptogram. For this reason, secure key distribution is a crucial problem in cryptography.
Since the publication of BB84 scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard, there has been much interest in using
quantum mechanics in cryptography [1–8]. The security of these quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes is based
on the fundamental postulate of quantum physics that “every measurement perturbs a system”. Indeed, passive
monitoring of transmitted signals is strictly forbidden in quantum mechanics. The “quantum no-cloning theorem”
[9,10] indicates that it is impossible to make an exact copy of an unknown quantum state.
Two well-known concepts for quantum key distribution are the BB84 scheme [1] and the Ekert scheme [2]. The
BB84 scheme [1] uses single photons transmitted between two parties (commonly called Alice and Bob). The sender
Alice uses non-orthogonal quantum states to transfer the key to the receiver Bob. Such states cannot be cloned,
hence any attempt by an eavesdropper, known as Eve, to get information on the key disturbs the transmitted signals
and induces noise which will be detected during the second stage of the transmission. Alice and Bob randomly pick
a subset of photons from those that are measured in correct bases and publicly compare their measurements. For
these results, they estimate the average error rate e. If e turns out to be unreasonably large, then eavesdropping has
occurred, all the data are discarded and they may re-start the whole procedure.
The Ekert scheme [2] is based on entangled pairs and uses the generalized Bell’s inequality (Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt inequality) [11,12] to establish security. Both Alice and Bob receive one particle out of an maximally entangled
pair. They perform measurements along at least three different directions on each side, where measurements along
parallel axes are used for key generation and oblique angles used for testing the inequality
Neither scheme described above which is based on non-orthogonal quantum cryptography has an efficiency more
than 50%. Recently, Lo et al. devise a modification [13] that essentially doubles the efficiency of the BB84 scheme,
where, Alice and Bob choose between the two bases independently but with substantially different probabilities ǫ and
1− ǫ. They also prove the security of their scheme.
In this paper, we present a new efficient QKD scheme with nonmaximally entangled states. Suppose Alice creates
pairs of photons in the nonmaximally entangled state |AB〉 which can be transformed to its equivalent state |AB〉′ with
the same Schmidt coefficients by local unitary transformations. She chooses pairs of photons in one of the two states
randomly, and sends a sequence of photons out of each pair to Bob. The two users choose their bases independently
with different probabilities and perform measurements. Similar to the scheme proposed by Lo et al., as two parties
are much more likely to be using the same basis, thus reducing the fraction of discarded data, a significant gain in
efficiency is achieved. To ensure our scheme is secure, we separate the accepted data into various subsets according
to the basis employed and estimate an error rate for each subset separately. We show that the refined error analysis
is sufficient in ensuring the security of our scheme against “a biased eavesdropping attack” [13].
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In next section, we give the detailed description of our efficient QKD scheme with nonmaximally entangled states.
By considering a simple biased eavesdropping strategy by Eve, we note that our refined analysis is an essential feature
of our scheme in Sec. III. In Sec. IV, the constraint on the probability ǫ is derived. Finally, we conclude the scheme
in Sec. V.
II. EFFICIENT QKD SCHEME WITH NONMAXIMALLY ENTANGLED STATES
In our scheme, there are two parties: the sender, Alice and the receiver, Bob. Alice prepares pairs of photons in
the nonmaximally entangled state
|AB〉 = α |H〉A |H〉B + β |V 〉A |V 〉B (1)
where |α|
2
+ |β|
2
= 1, and H and V denote the horizontal and vertical linear polarization, respectively. Then she
performs two “σx” operations on the two particles respectively to transform the state |AB〉 to its equivalent state
|AB〉
′
= β |H〉A |H〉B + α |V 〉A |V 〉B (2)
with probability 1
2
. Photon B is sent to Bob and photon A is left for Alice. There are two types of measurements that
Alice may perform: she may measure along the rectilinear basis, thus distinguishing between horizontal and vertical
photons. Alternatively, she may measure along the diagonal basis, thus distinguishing between the +45o and −45o
photons. Bob measures the polarizations at the other end. He measures in one of three bases, obtained by rotating
rectilinear basis by angles φ1 (φ
′
1
) = 0, φ2 (φ
′
3
) = tan−1 β
α
, φ3 (φ
′
2
) = − tan−1 β
α
. The surperscript “′” refers to the
case in which Alice chooses |AB〉
′
as the original state.
The two users are connected by a quantum channel and a classical public channel. The quantum channel consists
usually of an optical fiber. The public channel, however, can be any communication link. So how does this scheme
work?
1. Alice and Bob pick a number 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 and make its value public. The constraint on ǫ will be discussed in Sec.
IV.
2. Alice sends a sequence of photons B from each pair in one of the two nonmaximally entangled states (|AB〉 and
|AB〉′) chosen randomly and independently, and leaves the corresponding photons A. She also records her choice of
|AB〉 or |AB〉
′
.
3. Alice has two types of measurements. One measurement along rectilinear basis (i.e., {|H〉 , |V 〉}) allows her to
distinguish between horizontally and vertically polarized photons. The other measurement along diagonal basis (i.e.,{
1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉) , 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉)
}
) allows her to distinguish between photons polarized at +45o and −45o. Alice
chooses between the two types with probabilities 1 − ǫ and ǫ, respectively. If she detects photon A in the state |H〉
or 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉), the result is 0; else, the measurement can yield the result 1, and potentially reveal one bit of
information. She writes down her measurement bases and the results of the measurements.
4. For each photon, Bob performs measurements and registers the outcome of the measurements in one of three
bases, obtained by rotating the rectilinear basis by angles φ1 (φ
′
1
) = 0, φ2 (φ
′
3
) = tan−1 β
α
, φ3 (φ
′
2
) = − tan−1 β
α
, i.e.,
{|H〉 , |V 〉}, {α |H〉+ β |V 〉 , β |H〉 − α |V 〉}, and {β |H〉+ α |V 〉 , α |H〉 − β |V 〉}, with probabilities 1 − ǫ, ǫ
2
, and ǫ
2
,
respectively. Similar to the measurements performed by Alice, each measurement can yield two results 0 (if he detects
photon B in the state |H〉, α |H〉+β |V 〉 or β |H〉+α |V 〉) and 1 (if he detects photon B in the state |V 〉, β |H〉−α |V 〉
or α |H〉 − β |V 〉). The ensemble of these bits registered by both Alice and Bob is the raw key.
5. After exchanging enough photons, Bob announces on the public channel the sequence of bases he used, but not
the results that he obtained.
6. Alice compares this sequence with the states that she originally chose, and the list of polarizations which she
measured. Then she tells Bob on the public channel on which occasions his measurements have been done in the
correct bases. Whenever Alice and Bob used the compatible basis, they should get perfectly correlated bits. However,
due to imperfections in the setup, and to a potential eavesdropper, there will be some errors.
There are two cases in which Alice chooses entangled states |AB〉 and |AB〉
′
, respectively. For either of the two
cases, both Alice and Bob are much more likely to choose the rectilinear basis and obtain correlated bits, thus
achieving a significant gain in efficiency. If Alice chooses the diagonal basis, in order to generate a sifted key, Bob
should choose between the bases {α |H〉+ β |V 〉 , β |H〉 − α |V 〉}, and {β |H〉+ α |V 〉 , α |H〉 − β |V 〉} according to the
entangled state chosen by Alice and the polarization of photon A. (Otherwise, if he uses the rectilinear basis, he gets
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the outcomes 0 and 1 with probabilities |α|
2
and |β|
2
, respectively. These results abort.) Foe example, if Alice chooses
the state |AB〉 and sends photon B to Bob. Then if she detects photon A polarized at +45o by measuring along
the diagonal basis, Bob must choose the basis {α |H〉+ β |V 〉 , β |H〉 − α |V 〉} and photon B would be detected in the
state α |H〉+ β |V 〉. Therefore, they can generate a key bit “1” with probability 1
2
· ǫ · ǫ
2
. The bases used by Alice and
Bob agree with probability (1− ǫ)2 + ǫ
2
2
which goes to 1 as ǫ goes to zero.
Table I. Example of the case where Alice chooses |AB〉 as the original state. The measurement bases are
presented as the angles by which the rectilinear basis is rotated (here θ = tan−1 β
α
). The two users choose
a basis with certain probability to measure their particles and register the bit value (0 or 1), respectively.
The ensemble of these bits is the raw key. Alice tells Bob on the public channel on which occasions his
measurements have been done in the correct bases, and they keep only the bits corresponding to the
compatible bases. This is the sifted key.
A basis 0 0 0 0 0 0 π
4
π
4
π
4
π
4
π
4
π
4
A bit value 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
B basis 0 θ −θ 0 θ −θ 0 θ −θ 0 θ −θ
B bit value 0 1/0 1/0 1 1/0 1/0 1/0 0 1/0 1/0 1/0 1
compatible? y n n y n n n y n n n y
sifted key 0 1 0 1
7. For each of the two cases in which Alice chooses the entangled states |AB〉 or |AB〉
′
, Alice and Bob divide up
their polarization data into twelve cases according to the actual bases used and the bit values yielded (shown in Table
I), respectively. Then they throw away the eight cases when they have used non-compatible basis. Since the total
probabilities for the two users to obtain the results 0 and 1 are equal, the ensemble of these bits of the remaining four
cases is a sifted key. Hence, the remaining cases are kept for further analysis and to generate the secret key.
8. Alice and Bob divide up the accepted data into two subsets according to the entangled states originally chosen
by Alice. From the subset where Alice chooses |AB〉 as the prior state, there are three cases. In one case where Alice
and Bob both use the rectilinear basis (including two cases shown in Table I, in each of which the bit value is “0” or
“1”), they randomly pick a fixed number say m1 photons and publicly compare their polarizations. The number of
mismatches r1 (here, mismatch means the polarizations of photons are not correlated) tells them the estimated error
rate e1 =
r1
m1
. In the case where Alice uses the diagonal basis and Bob uses the basis {α |H〉+ β |V 〉 , β |H〉 − α |V 〉},
they pick a fixed number say m2 photons and publicly compare their polarizations. The number of mismatches r2
gives the estimated error rate e2 =
r2
m2
. In the case where Alice uses the diagonal basis and Bob uses the basis
{β |H〉+ α |V 〉 , α |H〉 − β |V 〉}, they pick a fixed number say m3 photons and publicly compare their polarizations.
The number of mismatches r3 gives the estimated error rate e3 =
r3
m3
. Similarly, from the subset where Alice chose
|AB〉
′
as the prior state, there are also three cases. Corresponding to the above discussion, we obtain the error rates
e′
1
=
r′
1
m′
1
, e′
2
=
r′
2
m′
2
and e′
3
=
r′
3
m′
3
.
Note that the test samples m1, m
′
1, m2, m
′
2, m3 and m
′
3 are sufficiently large, the estimated error rates e1, e
′
1, e2,
e′
2
, e3, and e
′
3
should be rather accurate [14,15]. Now they demand that e1, e
′
1
, e2, e
′
2
, e3, and e
′
3
< emax where emax
is a prescribed maximal tolerable error rate. If these independent constraints are satisfied, they proceed to the next
steps. Otherwise, they throw away the polarization data and re-start the whole procedure. Notice that the constraints
e1, e
′
1
, e2, e
′
2
, e3, and e
′
3
< emax are more stringent than the original naive prescription e < emax (here e is the average
error rate). We will discuss it in detail in Sec. III.
9. Reconciliation and privacy amplification (see Ref. [1,13]).
III. REFINED ERROR ANALYSIS
For each photon, the eavesdropper, Eve does not know which nonmaximally entangled state it is chosen from. So
for Eve, each photon is in an entangled mixed state. She has eavesdropping attack as below:
i). with a probability p1 measures polarization of each photon along the rectilinear basis and re-sends a photon
according to the result of her measurement to Bob;
ii). with a probability p2 measures polarization of each photon along the basis {α |H〉+ β |V 〉 , β |H〉 − α |V 〉} and
re-sends a photon according to the result of her measurement to Bob;
iii). with a probability p3 measures polarization of each photon along the basis {β |H〉+ α |V 〉 , α |H〉 − β |V 〉} and
re-sends a photon according to the result of her measurement to Bob;
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iv). with a probability 1− p1 − p2 − p3 does nothing.
Eve has a whole set of eavesdropping strategies by varying the values of p1, p2 and p3. Any of the strategies in this
set is called “a biased eavesdropping attack” [13].
Consider the error rate e1 (e
′
1) for the case both Alice and Bob use the rectilinear basis. For the biased eavesdropping
strategy under current consideration, errors occur only if Eve uses the other two bases. This happens with a conditional
probability p2 + p3. In this case, the polarization of the photon is randomized, thus giving an error rate
e1(e
′
1) = 2α
2β2 (p2 + p3) . (3)
Errors for the case where Alice uses the diagonal basis and Bob uses the basis {α |H〉+ β |V 〉 , β |H〉 − α |V 〉} occur
only if Eve is measuring along the rectilinear basis or the basis {β |H〉+ α |V 〉 , α |H〉 − β |V 〉}. This happens with a
conditional probability p1 + p3 and when it happens, the photon polarization is randomized. Thus, the error rate for
this case is
e2(e
′
3
) = 2α2β2p1 + 8α
2β2
(
α2 − β2
)2
p3. (4)
Similarly, errors for the case where Alice uses the diagonal basis and Bob uses the basis {β |H〉+ α |V 〉 , α |H〉 − β |V 〉}
occur only if Eve is measuring along the rectilinear basis or the basis {α |H〉+ β |V 〉 , β |H〉 − α |V 〉}. This happens
with a conditional probability p1 + p2. In this case, the error rate is given as
e3(e
′
2
) = 2α2β2p1 + 8α
2β2
(
α2 − β2
)2
p2. (5)
Therefore, Alice and Bob will find that, for the biased eavesdropping attack, the average error rate
e =
(1− ǫ)
2
(e1 + e
′
1) +
ǫ2
4
(e2 + e3 + e
′
2 + e
′
3)
2
[
(1− ǫ)
2
+ ǫ
2
2
] (6)
=
α2β2
[
2 (1− ǫ)
2
(p2 + p3) + ǫ
2p1 + 2ǫ
2
(
α2 − β2
)2
(p2 + p3)
]
(1− ǫ)2 + ǫ
2
2
.
Suppose Eve always eavesdrops only along rectilinear basis (i.e., p1 = 1, p2 = p3 = 0), then
e =
α2β2ǫ2
(1− ǫ)2 + ǫ
2
2
→ 0 (7)
as ǫ tends to 0, which is similar with the result of Ref. [13]. This means that if Eve is always eavesdropping along the
dominant basis, with a naive error analysis prescribed as e < emax Alice and Bob will fail to detect eavesdropping by
Eve.
To ensure the security of our scheme, it is crucial to employ a refined data analysis: the accepted data are further
divided into various subsets according to the actual basis used by Alice and Bob and the error rate of each subset is
computed separately. In Sec. II, we have already computed the error rates e1, e
′
1, e2, e
′
2, e3, and e
′
3 < emax where
emax is a prescribed maximal tolerable error rate. From Eqs. (3,4,5), we can see that these error rates e1, e
′
1
, e2, e
′
2
,
e3, and e
′
3
depend on Eve’s eavesdropping strategy and the degree of entanglement of the original state, but not on
the value of ǫ. So the refined data analysis guarantees the security of the present scheme.
IV. THE CONSTRAINT ON ǫ
From the above discussion, we know the value of ǫ should be small but can not be zero. If ǫ were actually zero,
the scheme would be insecure. The main constraint on ǫ is that there should be enough photons for an accurate
estimation of the six error rates e1, e
′
1
, e2, e
′
2
, e3, and e
′
3
. We assume that N entangled pairs are chosen by Alice, i.e.,
N photons are transmitted from Alice to Bob. On average, for |AB〉 or |AB〉
′
only Nǫ2/8 photons belongs to each of
the two cases where Alice uses the diagonal basis and Bob uses the basis {α |H〉+ β |V 〉 , β |H〉 − α |V 〉} or the basis
{β |H〉+ α |V 〉 , α |H〉 − β |V 〉}. To estimate e2, e
′
2, e3, and e
′
3 reasonably accurately, the number Nǫ
2/8 should be
larger than some fixed number say m = max (m2,m
′
2
,m3,m
′
3
). The numbers m2, m
′
2
, m3, and m
′
3
are the photon
number needed for the refined error analysis, which can be computed from classical statistical analysis. So
Nǫ2/8 ≥ m, (8)
ǫ ≥ 2
√
2m/N .
As N tends to ∞, ǫ can tend to zero, but never reach it. And the efficiency of this scheme is asymptotic 100%.
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V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
From the refined error analysis, we find the error rates depend not only on Eve’s eavesdropping strategy but also
on the degree of entanglement of the original state. For the biased eavesdropping attack, the error rates ei and e
′
i
(i = 1, 2, 3) are functions of αβ, the probability ǫ and the eavesdropping strategy of Eve (seeing Eqs. (3-5)). If Alice
uses a product state as the original state, i.e., αβ = 0, whatever the probability ǫ and Eve’s eavesdropping strategy
are, the error rates ei and e
′
i equal to zero. That is, Alice and Bob will never detect eavesdropping by Eve whatever
she does. In other words, if αβ = 0, the scheme is easily broken by an eavesdropper. The security of our scheme is
relying on the degree of the entanglement of the original state. If |αβ| = 1
2
, this scheme is equivalent to an efficient
“simplified EPR scheme” [3].
Of course, the QKD with nonmaximally entangled states may also be completed in another way. At first, the
nonmaximally entangled state |AB〉 = α |00〉 + β |11〉 (here |β| < |α|) can be concentrated to an EPR state [16,17]
with probability 2 |β|
2
[18]. If the concentration fails, EPR pairs are abandoned; else, they are used in an efficient
“simplified EPR scheme” [3]. Obviously, the total efficiency of this QKD process should be no more than 2 |β|
2
.
In summary, we propose a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme based on entanglement, where Alice and Bob
choose between various bases independently with substantially different probabilities. Since two parties are much
more likely to be using the same basis, thus reducing the fraction of discarded data, a significant gain in efficiency is
achieved. The efficiency can be tend to 100%, as the value of ǫ tends to zero (but can not reach it accurately).
To make the scheme secure against the dominant basis eavesdropping attack, it is crucial to have a refined error
analysis in place of a naive error analysis. We separate the accepted data into various subsets according to the basis
employed and estimate an error rate for each subset separately. It is only when all error rates are small enough that
the security of transmission is accepted.
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